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into evidence, and Ayers' con-
viction based on Section 
470A(b )(3)(i) should have been 
overturned. Id. at 660, 645 
A.2d at 50-51. 
By holding that Mary-
land's "Hate Crimes" statute is 
not unconstitutional as applied 
to the facts in Ayers v. State, the 
Blaine v. Blaine: 
INDEFINITE 
ALIMONY MAY BE 
AWARDED 
PURSUANT TO 
AN EXTENSION OF 
REHABILITATIVE 
ALIMONY. 
RECENT DEVELOPIVCIENTS 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
sent a warning to all Maryland 
citizens that crimes motivated 
by racial prejudice will not be 
tolerated. In so holding, the 
core of this opinion was that 
racial prejudice, by itself, will 
not be condoned, and when it is 
coupled with the commission of 
Indefinite alimony may 
be granted upon the termination 
of a fixed period of rehabilita-
tive alimony, ifit is determined 
that circumstances have arisen 
since the divorce which would 
render termination inequitable. 
In so holding, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland in Blaine v. 
Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 
413 (1994), broadened a trial 
court's discretion in extending 
indefinitely an original award of 
rehabilitative alimony under sec-
tions 11-106 and 11-107 of the 
Family Law Article of the An-
notated Code ofMaryland. Ad-
ditionally, the court concluded 
that an award of indefinite ali-
mony would be supported if the 
divorced parties' respective 
standards of living were found 
to be unconscionably disparate, 
and the formerly dependent 
spouse had made as much 
progress toward becoming self-
a crime, it will be separately 
punished. The court spoke with 
amoral conscience, and charged 
all Maryland citizens to uphold 
this moral code by respecting 
the differences of all human-
kind. 
- Andrea S. Holz 
supporting as could reasonably 
be expected. 
InNovember 1985, Ms. 
Blaine was granted an absolute 
divorce in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, and was 
awarded rehabilitative alimony 
in the amount of $800.00 per 
month for a period of sixty 
months. The alimony award 
was based on evidence that Dr. 
Blaine, Ms. Blaine's husband, 
earned a salary in excess of 
$62,000.00 a year compared to 
Ms. Blaine's income which to-
taled $10,000.00 a year. In 
granting a fixed period of alimo-
ny, the circuit court took into 
consideration the fact that Ms. 
Blaine was working towards a 
master's degree in health pro-
motion counseling, which she 
anticipated would lead to a po-
sitionearning$40,OOO.00ayear. 
Approximately five 
years later, Ms. Blaine made a 
__ . _____ ~_ .. 2S.2/U. Ba:i:. [~.?-4S 
Motion to Extend and Increase 
Alimony. In the period since the 
original award of alimony, Ms. 
Blaine had earned a master's 
degree in health promotion, but 
had failed to gain employment 
in this field of training. A do-
mestic relations master deter-
mined that her efforts to obtain 
employment in the health pro-
motion field had been reason-
able, but had been unsuccessful 
due to the static nature of the 
economy. He found that this 
was a change in circumstances 
the time of the divorce as pro-
vided for under section 11-
107(a)(1) of the Family Law 
Article. 
The master also con-
cluded that under section Il-
l 06( c )(2), Ms. Blaine had made 
as much progress as could be 
reasonably expected since she 
was employed in three jobs un-
related to her training, earning 
approximately $31,000.00 per 
year. Due to the evidence that 
Dr. Blaine's income had in-
creased to $136,750.00 annual-
ly, the master found the parties' 
respective standards of living 
were unconscionably disparate 
under section 11-1 06( c )(2). 
Therefore, he recommended that 
the alimony payments of 
$800.00 per month be extended 
indefinitely. 
Dr. Blaine filed excep-
tions to the findings and recom-
mendations made by the master. 
The exceptions were denied by 
the circuit court, which affirmed 
the master's recommendations 
and ordered the alimony pay-
ments of$800.00 per month be 
extended indefinitely. Dr. Blaine 
appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which up-
held the circuit court's ruling. 
The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land subsequently granted Dr. 
Blaine's petition for certiorari. 
On appeal to the court 
of appeals, Dr. Blaine argued 
that the lower courts erred in 
their application of section 11-
107 of the Family Law Article. 
Blaine, 336 Md. at 61,646 A.2d 
at 418-19. Section 11-107 pro-
vides for the extension of a pe-
riod of alimony, or, in certain 
situations, for the modification 
of the amount. He further con-
tended that the principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel 
barred the court from granting 
an award of indefinite alimony 
where it had earlier been deter-
mined that rehabilitative alimo-
ny was appropriate. Id at 62, 
646 A.2d at 419. 
Dr. Blaine maintained 
that the primary purpose of the 
statute was to provide financial 
support for a fixed period of 
time, allowing the dependent 
spouse to acquire the skills and 
training to become self-support-
ing. Having noted that Ms. 
Blaine's financial condition had 
improved since the original 
award of alimony, he argued 
that her inability to achieve her 
particular career goal was not a 
change in circumstances which 
warranted the extension of ali-
mony. Id Dr. Blaine also ob-
jected to the fact that his im-
proved economic condition 
since the divorce was consid-
ered evidence of the existence 
of an unconscionable disparity 
in the parties' respective stan-
dards ofliving. He claimed that 
the statute did not intend that 
the formerly dependent spouse 
should be entitled to have his or 
her standard of living conform 
to that of the other spouse. Id 
In addressing these is-
sues, the court of appeals ac-
knowledged that Maryland's 
alimony statute, codified as sec-
tions 11-101 through 11-111 of 
the Family Law Article, repre-
sents an important change in the 
approach to alimony in Mary-
land. The court agreed with Dr. 
Blaine that the underlying goal 
of the legislation was '" not to 
provide a lifetime pension but to 
facilitate a transition for the par-
ties from the joint married state 
to the separate single one .... '" 
Id. at64, 646A.2dat420(quot-
ing the Report of the Gover-
nor's Commission on Domestic 
Relation Laws (1980), at 4). 
However, the court noted that 
the interrelationship of sections 
11-106 and 11-107 of the stat-
ute reserves discretion in the 
trial court to ensure that the 
appropriate degree of spousal 
support is awarded after the dis-
solutionofamarriage.ld at 65, 
646 A.2d at 421. 
Section 11-106 governs 
the determination of the dura-
tion and amount of an alimony 
award. A trial court may grant 
alimony under section 11-
106(c)(2) for an indefinite peri-
od if"even after the party seek-
ing alimony will have made as 
much progress toward becom-
ing self-supporting as can rea-
sonably be expected, the respec-
tive standards of living of the 
parties will be unconscionably 
disparate." Md. Code Ann., 
Fam. Law § 11-106(c)(2) 
(1984). 
The court of appeals 
recognized that in the majority 
of situations indefinite alimony 
is awarded at the time of the 
divorce.ld at 65, 646 A.2d at 
420. It noted that the language 
of section 11-1 06( c) is prospec-
tive, requiring a trial court to 
predict whether the dependent 
spouse will likely become self-
sufficient in the future. The 
court, however, rejected the 
contention that an indefinite al-
imony award must always be 
granted at the time of the di-
vorce.ld Instead, it maintained 
that the language of section Il-
106 could be applied retrospec-
tively, when considering an ex-
tension of alimony under sec-
tion 11-107, to detennine ifcir-
cumstances since the divorce 
had arisen which "would lead 
to a harsh and inequitable result 
without an extension." Id at 
70,646 A.2d at 423. 
Although the court 
found the language of the stat-
ute plain and unambiguous, it 
refused to accept an interpreta-
tion that would require a me-
chanical application of the per-
spective language of section Il-
l 06( c), serving to limit the judi-
cial flexibility of awarding ali-
mony. Consequently, the court 
alternatively ascertained the leg-
islative intent of the alimony 
statute by analyzing the pro-
posed bill submitted by the Gov-
ernor's Commission on Domes-
tic Relation Laws, upon which 
the alimony statute was prima-
rily based. It interpreted the 
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Commission's aim as one which 
sought to vest substantial dis-
cretion in the courts to ensure 
that the needs of the recipient 
spouse were balanced against 
the ability ofthe payor spouse to 
provide financial support. Id at 
66,646 A.2d at 421. 
Consistent with this rea-
soning, the court of appeals 
noted that in Tu"isi v. Sanzaro, 
308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080 
(1987), it held that while the use 
of rehabilitative alimony was 
desirable, its use did not man-
date the elimination of the 
court's power to reserve future 
judgment.ld at 68, 646 A.2d at 
422. Quoting Tu"isi, the court 
stated that, "'factsbeforeacourt 
may demonstrate no present 
basis for either rehabilitative or 
indefinite alimony. But those 
same facts may show that a high-
ly probable basis for awarding 
one or the other will exist in the 
immediate future. '" Id (quot-
ing Tu"isi, 308Md. at 527, 520 
A.2d at 1086). Therefore, the 
court detennined that reserva-
tion of future judgement was 
consistent with the purposes of 
the statute. 
In applying this flexible 
interpretation, the court con-
cluded that the existence of new 
circumstances justifying both an 
extension of alimony under sec-
tion 11-107, and a possible ba-
sis for an award of indefinite 
alimony under section 11-106, 
call for the court to address 
whether the granting of indefi-
nite alimony would be neces-
sary to avert a harsh and inequi-
table result. Id at 70, 646 A.2d 
at 423. It reasoned that in deter-
mining if an indefinite extension 
is warranted, the trial court 
should review section 11-1 06(b) 
factors which were considered 
at the time of the original award 
to assist in adjudicating an ap-
propriate alimony award. Id at 
72, 646 A.2d at 424. 
The court accordingly 
rejected Dr. Blaine's argument 
that his current salary should 
not have been considered by the 
lower court in its finding that 
there existed an unconscionable 
disparity between the two par-
ties' standards of living. Id 
The court of appeals maintained 
that section 11-107 did not limit 
the relevant circumstances to 
those pertaining solely to the 
dependent spouse. Assessing 
Ms. Blaine's increase in salary 
without also considering Dr. 
Blaine's current income, the 
court found, would thwart the 
equitable determinations which 
are inherent to section 11-107. 
Id at 73, 646 A.2d at 425. 
Thus, the court determined that 
the application of the circuit 
court's findings in the original 
alimony award, viewed in light 
of the parties present income 
equation, provided "a frame-
work for the application of eq-
uitable principles, consistent 
with the stated goals of the Com-
mission Report and implicit in 
the language of [ section] 11-
106(c)(2) and [section] 11-
107(a)(I)." Id at 72,646 A.2d 
at 424. 
In the dissenting opin-
ion, Judge Bell, with whom 
Judge Chasanow joined, argued 
that "[t]he achievement of eq-
uity and flexibility [would] not 
25.2/ U. Bait. L.r. -51 
[be] furthered by permitting the 
trial court, on the petition of a 
formerly dependent spouse pur-
suant to [ section] 11-107, to 
revisit the duration of alimony 
issue long after it [had] deter-
mined that the appropriate form 
of alimony [was] rehabilitative." 
Id at 82,646 A.2d at 429. Bell 
insisted that if it was factually 
proven that rehabilitation could 
not be accomplished in the time 
predicted by the trial court judge, 
section 11-107 permits the court 
to correct what would "other-
wise be a harsh and inequitable 
result," by extending the period 
of time in which rehabilitation 
was to occur. Id He contend-
ed that section 11-107 was nev-
er intended by !he Legislature to 
be a mechanism by which the 
formerly dependent spouse 
would be provided "with a sec-
ond opportunity to prove what 
he or she was unable to prove 
the first time--that he or she 
[was] entitled to indefinite ali-
mony." Id 
By holding that a trial 
court's awarding of rehabilita-
tive alimony at the time of di-
vorce does not necessarily pre-
clude an award of indefinite al-
imony in the future, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Blaine 
v. Blaine added additional judi-
cial flexibility in the determina-
tion of the award of alimony. 
Although the court acknowl-
edged that the statute's under-
lying principle requires that the 
dependent spouse should be-
come self-supporting, the 
court's overriding aim was to 
ensure that the appropriate de-
gree of spousal support would 
adapt to circumstances that 
would otherwise result in ineq-
uitable standards of living be-
tween the parties. Hence, this 
decision should invite increased 
litigation, testing the degree of 
the court's commitment in up-
holding the statute's clear legis-
lative preference for granting 
rehabilitative alimony over an 
award of indefinite alimony. 
- Karen Tossey-Ardis 
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